The Vicissitudes of the 1948 Historiography of Israel by Pappé, I
The Vicissitudes of the 1948 Historiography of Israel
Author(s): Ilan Pappé
Source: Journal of Palestine Studies, Vol. 39, No. 1 (Autumn 2009), pp. 6-23
Published by: University of California Press on behalf of the Institute for Palestine Studies
Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/10.1525/jps.2010.XXXIX.1.6 .
Accessed: 28/03/2014 10:30
Your use of the JSTOR archive indicates your acceptance of the Terms & Conditions of Use, available at .
http://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsp
 .
JSTOR is a not-for-profit service that helps scholars, researchers, and students discover, use, and build upon a wide range of
content in a trusted digital archive. We use information technology and tools to increase productivity and facilitate new forms
of scholarship. For more information about JSTOR, please contact support@jstor.org.
 .
University of California Press and Institute for Palestine Studies are collaborating with JSTOR to digitize,
preserve and extend access to Journal of Palestine Studies.
http://www.jstor.org 
This content downloaded from 144.173.152.98 on Fri, 28 Mar 2014 10:30:00 AM
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
Journal of Palestine Studies Vol. XXXIX, No. 1 (Autumn 2009), pp. 6–23, ISSN: 0377-919X; electronic ISSN: 1533-8614.  
© 2010 by the Institute for Palestine Studies. All rights reserved. Please direct all requests for permission  
to photocopy or reproduce article content through the University of California Press’s  
Rights and Permissions website, at http://www.ucpressjournals.com/reprintInfo.asp. DOI: jps.2010.XXXIX.1.6. 
The VicissiTudes of The 1948 
hisToriography of israel
Ilan PaPPé
Arguing that history writing is a dialectical process fusing ideologi-
cal agenda and political developments with historical evidence, the 
author analyzes the two major transitions experienced by the Israeli 
historiography of the 1948 war: from the classical Zionist narrative 
to the “New History” of the late 1980s, and from the latter to the 
emergence of a “neo-Zionist” trend as of 2000. While describing the 
characteristics of these trends, the author shows how they are linked 
to concurrent political developments. Most of the article is devoted to 
an examination of the neo-Zionist historians who have emerged in 
recent years, based on their previously untranslated Hebrew works.
DesPIte the scIentIfIc objectIvIty and scholarly neutrality generally claimed for 
professional historiography and the academic enterprise, few sociologists of 
knowledge would contest the fact that history writing is based on choices and 
decisions. Indeed, a historical narrative is far more than a simple sequencing 
of events, but rather a way of extracting a plot out of collated facts, requiring 
historians to make decisions about what to include, exclude, emphasize, and 
how to structure the narrative. This being the case, it is inevitable that current 
political realities influence the agendas and orientations of professional histo-
rians, especially when the subject matter involves a disputed land, and even 
more so when the narrative is seen as playing a crucial—even existential—
role in that land’s ongoing struggle and self-image.
Such is the case of Palestine, and particularly the 1948 war that brought 
Israel into being. Testifying to the volatility of the historical narrative, Israeli 
historiography has undergone two major transitions in less than two decades. 
The first was from the classical Zionist narrative of a heroic Jewish struggle for 
survival against all odds that ended in the voluntary flight of the Palestinians 
from much of Palestine, to the “New History” narrative of the 1980s. This new 
narrative fundamentally challenged the earlier version, but around the year 
2000, it gave way to what I will call the “neo-Zionist” narrative that reembraced 
the spirit, if not the details, of the original Zionist version. In essence, it was a 
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The VicissiTudes of The 1948 hisToriography of israel 7
transition from adherence to the national consensus, to a recognition among 
certain elites of its many contradictions and fabrications, to a rejection of the 
post-Zionist questioning of the national consensus.
Such changes do not occur in a vacuum but are closely related to the poli-
tics and societal currents of the time; history is not just facts but a dialectical 
process of fusing ideological agenda with historical evidence. As I will explore 
below, the transitions were also linked to the vicissitudes of the peace process 
and closely reflect its development and demise.
The time that elapsed between the challenge posed by the New Historians, 
also commonly referred to as “post-Zionists,” and their disappearance from the 
scene was short, less than two decades. The reason for this brevity is doubtless 
to be found in the fact that the 1948 war is not only a story closely linked to 
current politics but also a foundational myth. According to Louis Althusser,1 
foundational myths are those most easily absorbed by society and accord-
ing to which the social order is structured and maintained. They provide the 
narrative that justifies the existence of the state, and as long as they remain 
relevant to the existing social order, they retain their force. In the case of Israel, 
of course, and despite the appeal and prominence enjoyed by the post-Zionist 
discourse for a time, the social order had not changed, which could explain 
why society so quickly reverted to its long-held beliefs. And because the his-
tory of the 1948 war is also linked to matters of war and peace, to relations 
with the Palestinians, and therefore to the entire future direction of the coun-
try, any professional academic conclusions about it were and are extremely rel-
evant for the political scene. This was recognized by the scholars themselves, 
as well as by the politicians involved in the peace process.2
A word is in order regarding the methodology used here. Deciphering what 
lies behind the decision to produce a certain narrative is beyond the capacity 
of sociology or, for that matter, the archeology of knowledge. Therefore, I have 
limited my attempt to pointing to the way in which changes in the political 
atmosphere are reflected in the narrative of the works produced by practicing 
historians focused on 1948. According to the ethos of academia, the work of 
these historians should in principle not be affected by changes in public mood 
or general political orientations. However, the case study I present in these 
pages—the Israeli historiography of 1948—indicates that, in this conflict 
especially, the writing of history absorbs and represents ideological disputes 
and political developments as much as any other cultural medium. The dif-
ference is that other media or discourses do not pretend to be objective or 
neutral.
hisToriography and socieTy: posT-Zionism and neo-Zionism
The “new narrative” of the 1948 war that appeared in the late 1980s included 
works of Israeli academicians described as New Historians and “critical soci-
ologists,” though the latter did not confine themselves to 1948 but covered a 
longer historical time span.3 What they had in common was a willingness to 
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look at the past and present Israeli reality through non-Zionist eyes. While they 
included relativists and positivists and came from a variety of disciplines, they 
shared a common liberation from the Zionist metanarrative, and many of the 
chapters they rewrote echoed the Palestinian version of history. Despite their 
frequent designation as post-Zionists, a number of them were actually liberal 
or critical Zionists, and their critique of Zionism was reflected in the works of 
artists, playwrights, filmmakers, journalists, writers, poets, and cultural produc-
ers in general. They operated with a high visibility in the 1990s before they 
disappeared at the end of that decade.
The political background of their emergence is found in a chain of events 
that began with the 1982 Lebanon War and was reinforced by the outbreak 
of the first Palestinian uprising in 1987. These events moved Israeli society as 
a whole into a more introspective phase regarding its relationship with the 
Palestinians. Politically, the new outlook translated into a willingness, however 
reluctant or tentative, to take part in the Middle East peace process, culminat-
ing in the Oslo Accord in 1993 and followed by the signing of the bilateral 
peace agreement with Jordan in 1994. With the assassination of Israeli prime 
minister Yitzhak Rabin in 1995, the sanguine optimism began to wane. A creep-
ing pessimism set in, along with a growing distrust in the Palestinians, a move 
to the right, and a scaling back of Oslo’s implementation and goals. At the same 
time, the popular appeal of the New Historians, or their post-Zionist manifesta-
tion, began to wane gradually.
What brought the “post-Zionist decade”—and the historiographical debate 
on 1948—to a definitive end was the outbreak of the second intifada in late 
September 2000. Almost immediately, a reinvigorated Zionist consensus, which 
had somewhat eroded at the height of the Oslo days, reasserted itself with 
force. Public discourse in Israel was reshaped along strictly consensual lines. 
Without doubt, the immediate reembrace of the Zionist consensus was greatly 
facilitated by the fact that Israel’s mainstream media uncritically accepted and 
widely disseminated the government’s propagandist version of Yasir Arafat and 
the PLO as not only the initiators of the second intifada but also as fully to 
blame for the failure of the 2000 Camp David summit. In the eyes of Jewish 
society and its political elite, Israel had done all it could to achieve peace but 
was met with extremism and intransigence, forcing the government to go from 
peace to war. The Palestinians had proved themselves to be enemies, thereby 
justifying the brutality of the Israeli response to the intifada and the closing 
of the public mind. Ariel Sharon’s election by a wide margin in February 2001 
confirmed the magnitude of the public support for the new policies, while 
the events of 9/11 facilitated the government’s depiction of Arafat as an arch-
terrorist associated with Bin Laden and of Israel’s response to the uprising as 
part of the global war on terror. As in the past, the media and academia were 
the principal agencies providing “professional” and even “scholarly” scaffold-
ing for these interpretations.4
Thus, just as the atmosphere and politics of the early 1990s had been con-
ducive for local historians to open a window to the Palestinian narrative and 
What the New Historians 
saw as human and civil 
rights abuses or even 
atrocities and war crimes 
are treated in the new 
research as normal and 
sometimes even com-
mendable behavior by the 
Israeli military.
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The VicissiTudes of The 1948 hisToriography of israel 9
even contemplate acceptance of some of its main claims, so the changed con-
ditions after 2000 provided fertile soil for a new generation of historians to 
entrench and barricade the narrative behind a wall of negation and fortify the 
collective identity in the face of renewed struggle.5
It is important to emphasize that while the traditional Zionist consensus 
was immediately restored and reembraced, the new historiographical narrative, 
which had already begun to assert itself prior to 2000, did not exactly reproduce 
the traditional Zionist narrative; it is not only history, but also historiography, that 
does not repeat itself. What emerged instead was a new-old narrative, updated to 
fit the shifting political realities on the one hand and to take into account and 
absorb the new information coming out of the Israeli archives on the other.
The new historiography was Zionist in its ideological orientation, its mode, 
its coloration, but it avoided the omissions, distortions, and denial of facts 
that had characterized the traditional Zionist version. The post-Zionists and 
New Historians, whose work had been based on Israeli archival sources to the 
extent that these were accessible at the time, had brought to light new facts 
concerning expulsions, massacres, and other war crimes committed in 1948 
that the neo-Zionist generation could not ignore. Most important for their 
emergence was the release in 1998 of major new documentation from the 
Israel Defense Forces (IDF) and Haganah archives, allowing professional histo-
rians in Israel to see with their own eyes in government documents the magni-
tude of the 1948 ethnic cleansing. Even “nationalist” and Orientalist historians, 
who had scorned Arab or Palestinian sources and relied exclusively on Israeli 
sources, could no longer deny the massive and intentional expulsions.6
Thus, from a purely factual standpoint, the neo-Zionist version of 1948 
did not differ significantly from that of the post-Zionists or New Historians. 
The difference was in the response or interpretation of 
the facts. What the New Historians saw as human and 
civil rights abuses or even atrocities and war crimes are 
treated in the new research as normal and sometimes 
even commendable behavior by the Israeli military. 
What the post-Zionists interpreted as shameful chapters 
in Israeli history are rejustified in the new research.7
From the neo-Zionist perspective, acceptance of the 
factual claims of the New Historians was accompanied 
by the categorical rejection (shared by the Israeli public 
at large) of the contemporary moral implications that 
the New Historians drew from their findings of Israel’s crimes in 1948, first 
and foremost the dispossession of the Palestinians. The neo-Zionists did not 
merely reject the interpretation of the post-Zionists but attacked them on moral 
grounds for dangerously undermining the legitimacy of the state. This approach 
is succinctly articulated in the journal Techelet, where some of Israel’s leading 
practicing historians publish regularly. It is a mouthpiece for what in Israel is 
called the “New Right,” which does not actually represent a rightist position but 
rather a consensual one, also accepted by historians of the Left.
What the New Historians 
saw as human and civil 
rights abuses or even 
atrocities and war crimes 
are treated in the new 
research as normal and 
sometimes even com-
mendable behavior by the 
Israeli military.
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Honest readers [of the work of the New Historians] cannot 
deny most of the facts presented by these historians about 
Zionism’s policies in the past . . . and yet it seems that the 
conclusion that these historians were looking for are aimed at 
undermining the very legitimacy of the fathers of the nation, 
who are not alive anymore. . . . We cannot underrate the perils 
of such an attack. . . . No nation would be able to keep its vital-
ity if its historical narrative were to be presented in public 
as morally defunct. [Moreover,] the novelty of what the New 
Historians did was in the perspective not the facts . . . these 
are not facts, but deep moral assessments.8
The above quote sums up the essence of the neo-Zionist response to the 
New Historians: acceptance of the basic facts they unearthed while castigat-
ing them on moral grounds. Indeed, what amounted to a distribution of labor 
developed among the scholars working within a neo-Zionist perspective on 
the 1948 events. One group undertook to challenge the moral underpinnings 
of the critical historiography and the other group focused on reexamining 
the factual evidence from which a new-old Zionist narrative of the 1948 war 
could be reconstructed in a way that would reflect the new mood in present-
day Israel.
The criTique of The new hisTorians and The moral debaTe
Paradoxically, even as the post-Zionist approach—and with it, the critical 
spirit within Israeli society—was totally silenced and marginalized with the 
outbreak of the second intifada, the attack on the New Historians (except 
for Benny Morris) showed no sign of abating. Even in its greatly diminished 
condition, the critique of Zionism from within Jewish society continued to 
be depicted as a grave danger to the Jewish character of the state. From 2000 
onward, questioning the national narrative in general and that of 1948 in par-
ticular was perceived as an ideological threat that needed to be countered 
professionally by academia at home and abroad.9
The critique of the New Historians—which had raged since their first 
emergence—thus continued even as their influence disappeared, but on new 
grounds that reflected neo-Zionism’s preoccupation with demonstrating the 
“morality” of the Zionist venture. Whereas in the early years of the post-Zionist 
challenge, the argument was about the facts, it has now shifted to “exposing” 
what lies behind the critical history and sociology that emerged in Israel as of 
the late 1980s. The earlier response was epitomized by Efraim Karsh, whose 
“fabricating history” allegations were later published in his book of the same 
title,10 but who made no mention of morality. In fact, the above-mentioned 
article in Techelet explicitly rebuked Karsh for failing to morally and ideologi-
cally confront the New Historians while going to battle against “undeniable 
facts.”11 The editors of the journal concluded that Israeli academia could not 
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permit the New Historians to set the research agenda on 1948, another cri-
tique absent from the earlier Zionist response.
The moral battle was waged especially outside Israel, where the message 
of the post-Zionists had made more lasting inroads. A number of books repre-
senting the neo-Zionist perspective on the 1948 war appeared in the United 
States in the years following the eclipse of the New Historians, but the best 
example is a collection edited by Anita Shapira and Derek J. Penslar, titled 
Israeli Historical Revisionism: From Left to Right (Frank Cass Publishers, 
2003). In their introduction, the editors declared that the revisionists, exclud-
ing Morris, had been waging an attack on Zionism itself,12 but the moral battle 
was led with the greatest passion by political philosopher Michael Walzer.13 
Presenting Zionism as a liberation movement of exceptional morality, Walzer 
characterizes the debate over the 1948 war as an existential battle against the 
forces of evil. He does not confront the facts but uses the discourse of “com-
plexity” to stifle the debate. The dispossession of almost a million Palestinians, 
the control through occupation, and the discrimination against almost another 
5 millions are all described as complex issues.14 In a similar vein, Zionist histo-
rian Daniel Gutwein of Haifa University, after arguing that there was nothing 
new in the factual claims of the New History, sees Zionism as facing formidable 
enemies, including postmodernists and nihilists bent on privatizing the collec-
tive sacred national memory for their own selfish, if not perverse, interests.15 
Others even accuse the New Historians of outright treason.16
Before examining the works of the neo-Zionist historians, a few words should 
be said about Morris, one of the most important of the New Historians, who, 
following what he described as his “turning point” in 2000, could be said to 
embody both of neo-Zionism’s hallmarks: its positivism and (in his political writ-
ings and interviews) its moral justification of the 1948 war. Morris had never 
been a post-Zionist nor had he ever shared the moral or ethical reading of the 
facts he uncovered. At the same time, he did not shy away from providing evi-
dence damning to the Zionist narrative. His book, The Birth of the Refugee 
Problem, 1947–1949 (Cambridge University Press, 1987), provided the first 
systemic evidence based on IDF sources of major expulsions during the 1948 
war. When the new documents were released in 1998 showing the expulsions 
to be far more premeditated, systematic, and extensive than had been shown 
in the more limited documentation available a decade earlier, Morris, ever the 
positivist, undertook what he referred to as the correction of a mistake and 
revised and expanded his book to reflect the new evidence. By the time the 
new edition was published in 2004, the new intifada was well underway and 
the revelation of what would earlier have been seen as “damning” new informa-
tion about 1948 fused conveniently with the closing of the public mind with 
regard to the Palestinians in the wake of the uprising. In the new atmosphere, 
not only were Israel’s brutal military operations against the Palestinians during 
the new intifada seen as justified, but so was their systematic expulsion in 1948. 
Morris, who had earlier been wrongly accused of being an “Israel hater” and a 
post-Zionist, now set an example for the neo-Zionists and was ideally situated to 
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provide hindsight justification for the 1948–49 expulsions. In an interview with 
Ha’Aretz published on 9 January 2004, he provided the ultimate justification 
for the ethnic cleansing in 1948: “Without the uprooting of the Palestinians, a 
Jewish state would not have arisen here.”17 Furthermore, he faulted Ben-Gurion 
for failing to “cleanse” the “whole Land of Israel, as far as the Jordan River,” which 
“would have stabilized the State of Israel for generations.”18
The new face of professional hisTory wriTing
Morris’s description of the ethnic cleansing of 1948 as an act of self-de-
fense, a choice “between destroying or being destroyed,” and his insistence 
that the 1948 war was one of those “circumstances in history that justify ethnic 
cleansing”19 characterizes well the underlying spirit of neo-Zionist work on 
1948 within the Israeli academy20 and in many recent collections on the war.21 
In some of the new works, the moral defense of the war approaches messi-
anic proportions. The introduction to one of the major collections on the war, 
the two-volume Israel’s War of Independence, 1948–1949 (in Hebrew; Israeli 
Ministry of Defense Publications, 2004), by its editor, Alon Kadish, is a good 
example. Kadish, a former head of the Hebrew University’s history depart-
ment, almost theologizes the 1948 Jewish war effort, referring to the outcome 
as a victory of the “just” over the “unjust” in a battle that averted a second 
holocaust,22 and to the year 1948 as the last link in the chain that “completed 
the redemption of the land and the return of the Jews to their homeland, as 
well as the renewal of their independence on the land.”23 In general, Kadish’s 
collection, with its scores of articles focusing on military dimensions of the 
war, exemplifies well the mix of messianic Zionist discourse and archival, pos-
itivist reconstruction that typifies the neo-Zionist approach. One might even 
suggest that it was thanks to the combined emphasis on messianic fulfillment 
and existential threat that the Judaization and de-Arabization of Palestine (not 
just in the areas earmarked for the Jewish state in the 1947 UN partition reso-
lution, but well beyond) is now fully recognized and morally justified as the 
principal goal of the Zionist leadership in 1948.
These elements (divine promise and existential survival) had likewise con-
stituted a crucial subtext of the “old history” of 1948 written before the New 
Historians, though the old history, as already indicated, tended to be more dis-
creet on such matters as expulsions and massacres. Another way in which the 
old mainstream Zionist historians differed from the neo-Zionist historians (and 
also from the New Historians) was that they were generally not professional 
historians but journalists and pundits who were part of the political elite. Still, 
one of the main practitioners of the neo-Zionist narrative wrote an entire book 
to vindicate the early historiography of 1948 as valid and scholarly.24
Many of the neo-Zionist historians of 1948 are postgraduates or newly minted 
scholars recently inducted into the community of professional historiography. 
They not only have access to the documents released from the IDF archives 
in 1998 but have also been entrusted with selective and top-secret material 
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that never would have been shown to scholars suspected of being critical of 
Zionism. Significantly, much of their work, which is in Hebrew, is published by 
the Israeli Ministry of Defense. The fruit of their efforts is quite voluminous 
and indicates both a new discourse and a fresh choice of subject matter, which 
generally moves away from the human dimensions of the war and toward its 
military aspects, with well-trodden military campaigns being reexamined from 
every possible angle. Modern themes such as Jewish civil society in wartime 
became favorites, redirecting the research away from the victimization of the 
Palestinians to tales of the heroic steadfastness of the Jewish community in 
1948.25 A number of works blamed the Palestinians for their fate, following the 
lead of Morris post-2000,26 as well as of established scholars who had steered 
clear of the New History, such as Yoav Gelber.27 But while the “blaming the 
Palestinians” theme is often a subtext in these works, sometimes it is explicit, as 
in the case of Tamir Goren,28 who focused specifically on the responsibility of 
the Palestinians for their exodus from Haifa. Other subject matters include the 
recruitment of Jewish volunteers abroad and their fate;29 the role played by the 
settlements;30 logistical problems of infrastructure, politics, and the military;31 
and the costs of the war and the economic factor.32 In the dominant mood of 
post-2000, Palestinian action and resistance in 1948 are recast in terms reflect-
ing modern-day terrorist organizations and actions.33 Some of the new research 
also reverts back to subject matters more characteristic of the old Zionist narra-
tive, such as the reinvention of 1948 as primarily a war of liberation against the 
British.34 This work also reaffirms the Zionist claim of “purity of arms,” though 
this time vis-à-vis the British forces instead of the Palestinians (while post-
Zionists focus on demolishing this myth).
A number of the above-mentioned works appear in Kadish’s edited two-
volume set, Israel’s War of Independence, whose introduction was discussed 
earlier. (The title is typical of neo-Zionist historiography, which has abandoned 
the neutral term “the 1948 war” used by the New Historians in favor of either 
the “war of independence” or “war of liberation.”) Taken as a whole, the Kadish 
collection illustrates many of the hallmarks of neo-Zionist historiography. Part 
of the new strategy, especially with regard to the expulsions, is to empha-
size them as common if not inevitable occurrences in war and treat them 
from an almost technical standpoint. This is effectively demonstrated in Haifa 
University geography professor Arnon Golan’s article bearing the wonderfully 
bland title “The Reshaping of the Ex-Arab Space and the Construction of an 
Israeli Space (1948–1950).” Golan, who had earlier taken a leading role in 
trying to refute the works of New Historians, here abandons his earlier denial 
of the ethnic cleansing to write:
The policy carried out with regard to the occupied Arab vil-
lages was their total destruction and the expulsion of the vil-
lagers who remained. The action was always implemented in 
keeping with the strictest interpretation of Plan Dalet . . .  There 
were also the phenomena of vandalism and revenge.35
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The facts are there, recounted matter of factly, without any hint of moral 
discomfort. Golan explains that both sides exercised the same policy of expul-
sion, typical in times of war. Still, he apparently felt compelled to offer some 
justification through a return to a theme he had developed in his 1993 doc-
toral dissertation: because 1948 had produced both Arab and Jewish refugees, 
the issue was one of “equal victimhood.”36 It bears emphasis that, in contrast 
to most writers claiming equal victimhood with reference to the Jewish refu-
gees from Arab countries, Golan specifically refers to the few hundred Jews 
whose settlements in what became the West Bank were dismantled and to the 
residents of the Jewish quarter in the old city of Jerusalem, all areas annexed 
to Jordan by prior Jewish consent. Like Morris in his new incarnation, Golan 
regrets the absence of a more effective and coordinating hand in the division 
of the spoils of war resulting from the systematic Israeli pillaging of Palestinian 
property, houses, lands, and bank accounts, but points out that the disposses-
sion of the Palestinians was the only way to make possible the absorption 
of so many Jewish immigrants after the 1948 war.37 His approving treatment 
of Israel’s antirepatriation policy (also now condoned by Morris)38 is another 
aspect of this.
Not surprisingly, many of the chapters of Israel’s War of Independence 
reproduce the basic outline of events recounted by the New Historians, albeit 
with very different results. Dani Hadari’s chapter, for example, emphasizes (as 
do the New Historians) Plan Dalet’s importance in precipitating the ethnic 
cleansing of Palestine.39 Although Hadari does sanitize the terminology (he 
refers to the part of the plan detailing instructions to destroy Palestinian vil-
lages merely as “an important military mission”40), he makes no attempt to 
conceal actions that traditional Zionist writers would have preferred to avoid. 
For example, not only does he write that the Jewish troops rarely honored Plan 
Dalet’s offer of surrender to Palestinian villages that had been promised immu-
nity, he also commends the army for its harsh interpretation of the plan, ascrib-
ing it to the army’s known propensity to “take the initiative”—litol yozman.41 
He even highlights the case of Umm Zayant, a village 
that was promised immunity but was destroyed and its 
inhabitants expelled despite their overtures of peace. 
Hadari employs the same tone when discussing the 
army’s policy of shooting villagers trying to return to 
their villages after having been expelled. As with other 
such actions, he treats it as a purely military problem. 
Hadari has high praise for the IDF’s “de-Arabization” of 
the Galilee from May to October 1948. (Interestingly, 
while the term “ethnic cleansing” is almost never used 
by the neo-Zionists, the term “de-Arabization” has been 
adopted; yet in pre-1948 classical Zionist discourse, Arabs were rarely even 
mentioned and such a term would have been unthinkable. The land, after all, 
was basically “empty,” and the task was therefore to colonize. Only a few overtly 
acknowledged that colonization required removal of the local population.)
While the term “ethnic 
cleansing” is almost never 
used by the neo-Zionists, 
“de-Arabization” has 
been adopted, a term that 
would have been unthink-
able in pre-1948 classical 
Zionist discourse.
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Among the numerous other examples of the neo-Zionist tendency to recount 
events unapologetically that earlier would have aroused at the very least uneasi-
ness (or simply been omitted), I will briefly mention only a few. The writer Uri 
Milstein, for instance, describes in detail the massive looting of Palestinian houses, 
but uses the phenomenon not to criticize the acts themselves but to expose 
the Haganah’s disorganization and failure to coordinate.42 Two chapters in 
the Kadish volume are also good examples of the neo-Zionist treatment of the 
systematically aggressive policy of the Zionist forces toward the Palestinian 
or mixed towns, where they premeditatedly drove out the Palestinian inhab-
itants. The chapter by Yoav Peleg43 on the April 1948 operations in Jaffa cor-
roborates the New Historians’ finding that the military confrontation in the 
town and the expulsion of its fifty thousand Arabs could have been avoided 
but that Haganah commanders did not want the Arabs to remain. A similar 
picture emerges from Moshe Arnewald’s chapter depicting the expulsion of 
the Palestinian population of West Jerusalem during the same period.44
Both researchers find this policy acceptable and neither shows any sign of 
the moral reservations typical of the New Historians. For example, the final 
pages of Peleg’s article describe how the Irgun carried out its operation to 
“cleans[e] enemy outposts” by “relentlessly bombard[ing] the Ajami quarter 
and the other Arab neighborhoods of the town center with the objective 
of breaking the inhabitants’ morale and creating chaos and havoc to cause 
mass flight.”45 The objective of the Jewish plan to take over West Jerusalem as 
recounted by Arnewald is identical: “to cause a flight from the Arab neighbor-
hoods outside the Old City and the concentration of the Arab population in 
it.”46 He comments that as a result of the attacks, “the population density of the 
Old City by May 1948 was unbearable,” its original population having doubled 
or even tripled.47 Despite the “gravity” of the living conditions and hygienic 
situation, and although “on 8 May typhus broke out and riots began due to the 
scarcity of food and flour,” he claims that the population there felt secure.48 
In fact, the Old City population with its refugees did remain, but virtually the 
entire Arab population of west Jerusalem was driven out as a result of these 
actions.
Many (if not most) of Kadish’s authors focus either on military operations 
or dimensions having a decisive impact on the direction of the war, or on 
prominent issues in the debate over 1948. By comparison, Aharon Klein’s 
topic49—the 1948 prisoners of war (POWs)—was little more than a sideshow. 
Still, it is useful to spend some time on his chapter as it is illustrative of many 
of the characteristics of the neo-Zionist historians we have been discussing. 
Klein had access to the IDF files released on the POWs and his findings largely 
confirm those of Salman Abu Sitta’s study,50 which was based solely on oral 
histories and relevant reports from the International Red Cross (IRC) archives 
(Klein cites the IRC archives and Abu Sitta among his sources). In Abu Sitta’s 
account, the POWs were mostly citizens of the new state under international 
law who were not only imprisoned but also ethnically cleansed in that they 
were permanently uprooted from their villages but permitted to remain within 
JPS3901_02_Pappe.indd   15 3/9/10   11:07:26 AM
This content downloaded from 144.173.152.98 on Fri, 28 Mar 2014 10:30:00 AM
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
16 Journal of palesTine sTudies
Israel’s borders. About five thousand of them were exposed to forced labor 
and systematically harassed.51
Klein, who accepts Israeli policy toward the 1948 POWs as unavoidable, 
notes in passing that intelligence officers had permission to decide on the 
spot which Palestinians captured in military operations could be executed 
immediately—a reference that corroborates Palestinian oral recollections of 
summary executions in occupied villages and neighborhoods throughout 
Palestine. Although he does report cases of barbarism and executions in the 
POW camps themselves, he states that these were not the norm and attri-
butes excesses to the major logistical problems inevitable when thousands of 
men are taken prisoner. In his section on the “Guards of the Camp” (Shomeri 
Hamahanot),52 he also notes that most of the camp guards were members of 
the Stern group and the Irgun, suggesting that if exceptional brutality occurred 
it came from the “extreme right.”53
According to Klein, anyone over the age of ten who appeared suspicious 
was a legitimate POW, and the troops were ordered to seize as many POWs 
as possible.54 While not directly expressing misgivings about the tender age 
of the child POWs—whom he sometimes refers to as “children” and some-
times as “soldiers”—he does appear to want to fend off potential criticism. 
Thus, we are given the rather extraordinary explanation that small children 
were captured as POWs only after their mothers had been expelled. This is 
undoubtedly true, since the Zionist forces separated all male children and 
adolescents above the age of ten from their mothers before expulsion as a 
matter of course,55 but the implication here seems to be that the capture and 
imprisonment of very young children was a humanitarian act to save them 
from being left on their own.
With regard to the entire concept of forced labor, Klein commends the 
Israeli army for its efficient and purposeful use of the prisoners who fell into 
their hands. Most of the prisoners were Palestinian teenagers and young men 
in their early twenties, not soldiers, and were employed in hard labor.56 The 
following passage about the construction of labor camps—based on an IDF 
document that never would have been made available to critical scholars—is 
a good illustration of neo-Zionist historiography’s bland, matter-of-fact, tech-
nocratic approach, which contrasts so sharply with the moral indignation that 
such information would have occasioned in post-Zionist scholars even when 
not made explicit in their historical texts.
The occupational potential present in thousands of Arab POWs 
was enormous. The Israeli market suffered from a serious defi-
cit in working hands and the military system was in urgent 
need of new [military] bases and many camps. [Furthermore, 
t]he realization that employing the POWs would solve some 
of the problems and needs of the IDF led to the decision to 
build two special labor camps for captives—one in Sarafand 
and the other in Tel-Littwinski [Tel-Hashomer hospital today]. 
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The building of the camps was completed in September 1948. 
Another special labor camp was opened for several months in 
Umm Khalid near Netanya. . . . The construction of labor camps 
was a significant quantum leap in the exploitation of man-
power within the POWs, whose numbers kept growing.57
Finally, Klein commends the army for introducing order into the system 
and implies that the situation was beyond their control: “Although the young 
military system of the IDF was not prepared for this affair . . . it succeeded in 
organizing itself in a reasonable manner and solving satisfactorily the prob-
lem of the prisoners.”58 By the end of October/early November 1948, the 
employment of POWs was systematized, backed by procedures, orders, forms, 
and reports. Nowhere in Klein’s account is there any hint about the horrors 
described in the following first-hand account recorded in the immediate after-
math of the war by a Palestinian survivor:
We were loaded into waiting trucks. . . . Under guard we were 
driven to Um Khalid . . . and from there to forced labor. We 
had to cut and carry stones all day. Our daily food was only 
one potato in the morning and half a dried fish at night. They 
beat anyone who disobeyed orders. After 15 days they moved 
150 men to another camp. I was one of them. It was a shock 
for me to leave my two brothers behind. As we left the others, 
we were lined up and ordered to strip naked. To us this was 
most degrading. We refused. Shots were fired at us. Our names 
were read we had to respond ‘Sir’ or else. We were moved to 
a new camp in Ijlil village. There we were put immediately 
to forced labor, which consisted of moving stones from Arab 
demolished houses. We remained without food for 2 days, 
then they gave us a dry piece of bread.59
Klein says little about the camp conditions other than that the prisoners were 
well fed and paid for their work.60 As reference for this latter claim, he quotes 
an IDF document summarizing what the army told a delegation of the IRC, 
making no mention that the IRC documents, which juxtapose the IDF report 
with the testimonies of the inmates, give exactly the opposite impression.61 
But at least Klein does not present the camp experience as something positive 
for those who lived through it. This is in contrast to the volume’s editor, who 
in his general introduction to the collection comments with regard to Klein’s 
article that “some of them [the Palestinian POWs] must have been happy since 
they sometimes worked in places where they had earlier been employed by 
the British.”62
The neo-Zionist historiographical paradigm has now also been introduced 
into Israel’s educational system. In the late 1990s, two textbooks hinting at 
the possibility of Palestinian expulsions in 1948 were under consideration for 
inclusion in the national curriculum, but after heated debate in the Knesset 
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Education Committee, they were rejected. But what was taboo in 1999 has 
become legitimate since 2000, and the education ministry’s official curricu-
lum now uses a book that teaches pupils that the Israeli army began expel-
ling Palestinians and destroying their villages to prevent their return about a 
month and a half into the war. Given that the war is officially seen as having 
begun on 15 May when the Arab armies entered Palestine (the implementation 
of Plan Dalet is not considered part of the “war”), a month and a half into the 
war would be early July.63 Even leaving aside the rather extraordinary explana-
tion that the expulsions were initiated because the population was no longer 
leaving voluntarily, there is no historical data to support this version; in fact, 
all of the evidence presently available in the IDF archives attests to systematic 
expulsions having depopulated more than three-quarters of the refugees by 
July. What is interesting, however, is that the expulsions are now unambigu-
ously acknowledged in the school curriculum.
After thoroughly examining the history, geography, and civics textbooks 
addressing the 1948 war that are part of the curriculum, educationalist Daniel 
Bar Tal concludes that the Zionist view of the conflict predominates and that 
the works convey an image of Jewish victimhood and a negative stereotyping 
of the Arabs.64 Other authors corroborate the finding that Zionism pervades 
the history dealing with 1948.65
conclusion
The transformation in the Zionist discourse is well illustrated by juxta-
posing two quotes from Anita Shapira with regard to the expulsion of the 
Palestinians. In a 1999 article in the New Republic, she wrote:
The Arab panic led to an exodus and to the collapse of the 
institutions of Palestinian society. The more the magnitude of 
the exodus became clear, the more admissible and attractive 
the idea seemed to Israeli leaders and military commanders—
not because the Zionist movement had been planning such 
an evacuation all along but because a remote option (even 
if there were some who harbored such hankerings) gained 
acceptance in the context of the behavior of both sides 
during the war.66
Five years later, the Arab exodus depicted by Shapira as a “remote option” 
barely contemplated by the Israeli political and military leadership as late 
as spring 1948 (even though some may have “harbored hankerings” for it) 
could suddenly be presented concretely and no longer qualified as contin-
gent on the behavior of the Arab side. In her 2004 biography of Yigal Allon, 
for example, Shapira wrote that he “was the most consistent supporter of 
transferring the Palestinians and even committed massive expulsions in the 
war of independence.”67 She also approvingly quotes Allon’s statement at a 
public lecture in 1950 that an “eternal justification” (i.e., the eternal right 
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of the Jewish people to a homeland without “aliens”) validated the massive 
expulsions of Palestinians. To this, she added that “He did his best not only 
to occupy the land of Israel, but also to depopulate it.”68 The extent of the 
official or mainstream embrace of the reality of the expulsions as something 
positive, a necessary prelude to attaining Jewish rights, is also well illus-
trated by the fact that the website for the virtual library of Israel’s Centre for 
Educational Technology, a government agency supervised by the ministries 
of education and culture, carries numerous references to the expulsions of 
the Palestinians in 1948.
In yet another example of facts denied in the past and now embraced, in 
the late 1990s, the New Historians had successfully demolished the character-
ization of the 1948 war as a Jewish David against the Arab Goliath, a myth that 
was crucial for developing both contempt for Arabs and Palestinians and for 
cultivating a sense of invincibility of almost metaphysical proportions. At the 
beginning of the twenty-first century, the IDF released two documents reveal-
ing that the Israeli forces had a military advantage of two to one during the 
1948 war, a fact now widely accepted but presented in a way that strengthens 
rather than weakens faith in this mythology. The following quote from Leah 
Segal of the neo-Zionist school of thought is a good illustration.
[These documents] teach us that 1948 was not a war of the 
few against the many. This is an undeniable fact today. But 
why do people claim that it debunks the myth of the few 
against the many? How did an army representing 65,000 
people defeat armies that represented 35 million people?’ 
The answer is it was “a war between quality and quantity.”69
Any other interpretation, she adds, is from the school of historians such as Ilan 
Pappé and Avi Shlaim, who willingly became the spokespeople of Palestinian 
propaganda.
The transition in Israel from a hopeful period of peace to the pessimism of 
war has been reflected in professional historiography and ideological debates 
within Israeli Jewish society. I have described this vacillation as ranging from 
a post-Zionist position critical of Israel’s past and present conduct (sometimes 
to the point of questioning the legitimacy and moral validity of the Zionist 
ideology) to a neo-Zionist position still strongly adhering to the basic tenets 
of classical Zionist ideology. Ideology’s powerful hold on historiography was 
already evident in the early 1990s, when the scholarly debate in Israel regard-
ing what happened in 1948 was conducted not only on the academic stage 
but even more so in the public arena, where a discourse of patriotism and 
humanism was often employed to justify both positions.
The reason why the professional Israeli historiography of 1948 is such a 
clear example of the biased nature of the historiographical enterprise is due to 
1948’s central role in the national narratives of both Palestinians and Israelis. 
That year is seen as a miraculous year by the Zionist movement and as a cata-
clysmic catastrophe by the Palestinians, having produced both the State of 
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Israel and the Palestinian refugee problem. Both issues will remain open as 
long as the conflict continues.
A review of the reversals of fortune of post-Zionism and the ascendance 
of neo-Zionism in the research on 1948 can serve three purposes. First, it can 
demonstrate once more how ideology impacts the production of professional 
historiography in agitated societies such as Israel. Second, it can provide a 
barometer of the present intellectual and cultural orientation of Jewish soci-
ety in Israel, often neglected at the expense of the near exclusive focus on 
government policies and military strategies as the only factors determining a 
state’s position vis-à-vis a given reality. Finally, it confirms once again that the 
struggle over memory will remain a crucial factor in shaping the conflictual 
reality of Israel and Palestine and will impact the chances of reconciliation 
in the future.
As a final footnote, I would add that the currently prevailing consensus 
in Israel justifying whatever happened during the 1948 war has far-reaching 
political implications. It reveals an Israel unwilling to reconcile with the past 
and with the Palestinians, an Israel overconfident that its policies of ethnic 
cleansing and dispossession can be morally justified and politically maintained 
as long as there are Western academics and politicians who are reluctant to 
apply the same set of values and judgments to the Jewish state that they have 
applied, quite brutally, to countries in the Arab and Muslim world.
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